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I. INTRODUCTION
The legal community traditionally has discounted reports of
childhood sexual abuse as mere "fantasies and falsehoods."' More-
over, up until recently a majority of "American society [has] re-
fused to acknowledge the prevalence and severity of childhood
sexual abuse."2 Now that society is slowly awakening to the breadth
of the problem, studies have shown just how pervasive the problem
is: Between 1976 and 1986, the United States saw a 2100% increase
in the number of reported cases of childhood sexual abuse.3 By
1991, reported cases had increased yet another 327% to 432,0004
cases a year. Minnesota's experience reflects national trends. In
1994, the Minnesota Department of Human Services reported that
there were 2647 allegations of child sexual abuse filed.5 Of all the
cases filed with the department in 1994, over 25% were confirmed
cases of child sexual abuse.
In response to what appears to be an expanding acknowledg-
ment of the pervasiveness of this problem, Minnesota's legislature,
courts, and jurors have responded with, among other things,
greater criminal penalties7 and large damage awards."
1. Gregory G. Gordon, Adult Survivors of Childhood Sexual Abuse and the Stat-
ute of Limitations: The Need for Consistent Application of the Delayed Discovery Rule, 20
PEPP. L. REv. 1359, 1362 (1993).
2. Id.
3. See Lori Koester Scott, Sex Offenders: Prevalence, Trends, Model Programs, and
Costs, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN CRIME AND JUSTICE 52, 54 (Albert R. Roberts ed., 1994)
(noting a change from 6000 cases reported annually to 132,000 cases 20 years
later).
4. See id.
5. See MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVIcES, DHS REPORTS DATA ON
CHILD MALTREATMENT FOR 1994, at 7 (1996).
6. See id.
7. The criminal law has been slow to recognize the harms associated with
sexual abuse crimes. For example, the act of incest was not an official crime until
Minnesota codified it in 1963. See Act of May 17, 1963, ch. 753, art. I, § 609.365,
1963 Minn. Laws 1185, 1206. Early on, when the Minnesota Legislature did ac-
knowledge a specific sexual act as a crime, the penalty was not too severe. In
1976, the penalty for first-degree criminal sexual conduct was a maximum of 20
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In 1989, the Minnesota legislature responded to the commu-
nity's demand for retribution by promulgating what is popularly
known as the "delayed discovery rule."9 This rule of law suspends
the statute of limitations for a child sexual abuse cause of action
until the time when the victim recognizes that the abuse caused her
or his injuries.10 From 1989 to 1996, Minnesota adults were able to
commence suits against their childhood abusers because the court
of appeals had interpreted Minnesota's delayed discovery rule as
tolling the statute of limitations until the plaintiff knew or had rea-
son to know that the abuse caused his or her injuries."
Then, in 1996, the Minnesota Supreme Court decided Blacko-
wiak v. Kemp," a decision many believe "dealt a setback to victims of
child sexual abuse." 13 Currently, the law under Blackowiak equates a
child's knowledge that he or she has been abused, or even a child's
feelings of shame or guilt, with the understanding that the abuse has
injured the victim. 1 4 Thus, under this decision, the statute of limi-
tations begins to run against the child's cause of action at the in-
stant the child pauses and thinks, "I don't like this. This is wrong!"
Minimal scrutiny of the court's opinion reveals, however, that the
court's holding is riddled with illogical rationalizations and ulti-
mately disregards the legislature's motivations. Not only is this
holding contrary to the legislative intent of the statute, it is an
abuse of the judiciary's power under the separation of powers doc-
trine and effectively repeals the delayed discovery rule.15
This Article discusses the development and current state of the
years' imprisonment. See MINN. STAT. § 609.342 (1976). Today, however, the leg-
islature views the penalty for the same crime as requiring a term of not more than
thirty years' imprisonment and/or a $40,000 fine. See MINN. STAT. § 609.342,
subd. 2 (1996).
8. See, e.g.,J.A.H. v. Demo, No. CO-94-588, 1994 WL 411570, at *1 (Minn. Ct.
App. Aug. 9, 1994) (affirming a jury award of $450,000 in compensatory damages
and $500,000 in punitive damages, which had been reduced at a new trial from
the original award of $30 million in punitive damages).
9. See Act of May 19, 1989, ch. 190, § 2, 1989 Minn. Laws 485, 486-87 (codi-
fied as amended at MINN. STAT. § 541.073 (1996)).
10. See id.
11. See, e.g., M.L. v. Magnuson, 531 N.W.2d 849, 855 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
12. 546 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1996).
13. High Court Drops Suit Alleging Sex Abuse by School Counselor, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), April 20, 1996, at 3B.
14, See id.
15. See id. (quoting Blackowiak's attorney, John Murrin, as saying, "[T]he
court is... superimposing themselves [sic] as rulers of who can sue over and
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delayed discovery rule, both inside and outside of Minnesota. Part
II describes the scientific impetus behind the delayed discovery
rule by discussing the short and long-term effects of childhood
sexual abuse, and it considers how the repressed memory debate
has factored into the debate over the delayed discovery rule. Part
III discusses the history of the delayed discovery rule and its appli-
cation in other states. Last, Part V analyzes the Minnesota delayed
discovery rule and concludes that in the Blackowiak case the Minne-
sota Supreme Court incorrectly defined how lower courts are to
apply the delayed discovery rule to child sexual abuse causes of ac-
tion. Moreover, a review of the statute's legislative history, Minne-
sota's precedents, and how other states have addressed this issue
will substantiate that the supreme court's decision is erroneous.
II. THE EFFECTS OF CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ABUSE
A survivor of childhood sexual abuse may first manifest inju-
ries resulting from the abuse either during the abuse, immediately
thereafter, or even years after the abuse has ended. 6 Because the
effects of abuse can surface at any time, it is necessary to consider
the possible short and long-term effects.
A. Initial Effects
While research about child sexual abuse began providing sub-
stantial insights only within the last fifty years, much is already un-
derstood about the initial effect it has on victims. Initial effects are
defined as those effects that occur "within two years of the termina-
tion of abuse." 7 A 1984 study of sexually abused children, con-
ducted by researchers affiliated with the Division of Child Psychia-
try at the Tufts New England Medical Center, found that the most
common initial mental effects of childhood sexual abuse are fear,
anger, and hostility.6 "Guilt and shame" are other frequently ob-
16. See Denise J. Gelinas, The Persisting Negative Effects of Incest, 46 PSYCHIATRY
312, 314 (1983).
17. Angela Browne & David Finkelhor, Initial and Long-Term Effects: A Review
of the Research, in A SOURCEBOOK ON CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 143, 144 (David Finkel-
hor ed., 1986); see also Sandra Conroy, Comment, The Delayed Discovery Rule and
Roe v. Archdiocese, 13 LAW & INEQ. J. 253, 256 (1995) (discussing the immediate
and long-term effects of sexual abuse).
18. See Browne & Finkelhor, supra note 17, at 149. Thirteen of the four- to
six-year-olds studied displayed severe fear, and 13-17% manifested above-normal
levels of aggressive and antisocial behavior; 45% of the seven- to 13-year-olds ex-
[Vol. 23
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served reactions to child sexual abuse. 9 Besides possibly causing
numerous mental difficulties, child abuse often affects victims by
eliciting numerous physical responses.0 Sexual abuse may manifest
itself in such ways as sleep disturbances, changes in eating habits,
21and adolescent pregnancy. Occurrences of sexual disease, sexual
and social dysfunction,2 and contemplated and attempted suicide
23are also common.
Yet, these are only the initial effects of the abuse. The reality is
that regardless of when the injuries manifest, "[t]he effects of
childhood sexual abuse are frequently lifelong and severe."24 It is
therefore necessary to consider some of the enduring implications
of being a victim of child abuse.
B. The Murky Long-Term Effects
While knowledge about the initial effects of child sexual abuse
is seemingly abundant, less is known about the long-term effects of
childhood sexual abuse. There are several interrelated reasons
why this is so.
First, victims are understandably reluctant to discuss their
problems.25 Researchers have been further stymied by the fact that
many professionals are hesitant to deal with the problem of sexual
hibited severe fear, and 45-50% evinced aggressive and antisocial behavior; 36%
of the 14- to 18-year-olds studied demonstrated fear of being harmed. See id.
19. See id. However, few studies have shown clear percentages. See id. A
1969 study revealed 64% of sexual abuse victims expressed guilt problems. See id.
at 149-50 (citing V. DEFRANCIS, PROTECTING THE CHILD VICTIM OF SEX CRIMES
COMMITTED BY ADULTS (1969)). A 1981 study concluded only 25% of victims ex-
perienced feelings of guilt. See id. at 150 (citing S.C. Anderson et al., Psychosocial
Sequelae in Intrafamilial Victims of Sexual Assault and Abuse; a paper presented
at the Third International Conference on Child Abuse and Neglect, Amsterdam,
Netherlands, April 1981).
20. See id. at 144.
21. A 1969 study reported that 11% of child victims became pregnant as a
result of sexual abuse; however, this figure is higher than other reports. See id. at
150. A 1978 study reported that only one out of 47 victims was impregnated as a
result of incestuous abuse. See id. (citing K. MEISELMAN, INCEST: A PSYCHOLOGICAL
STUDY OF CAUSES AND EFFECTS WI TREATMENT RECOMMENDATIONS (1978)).
22. See id. at 151-52.
23. See Gelinas, supra note 16, at 317.
24. Mic HUNTER, ABUSED BOYS: THE NEGLECTED VICTIMS OF SEXuAL ABUSE 45
(1990).
25. See Brandt F. Steele & Helen Alexander, Long-Term Effects of Sexual Abuse
in Childhood, in SEXUALLY ABUSED CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES 223 (Patricia
Beezley Mrazek & C. Henry Kempe eds., 1981).
19971
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abuse. 26 The third, and least predictable factor, is how a child will
react to sexual abuse. 7 A child's reaction is difficult to gauge be-
cause of the numerous variables involved in a typical abuse case.
More specifically, the impact of childhood sexual abuse upon the
child will differ depending on "the child's age, stage of psychosex-
ual development, the nature of the abusive act, the frequency of
repetition, the amount of aggression involved, and the relationship
of the abused to the abuser., 28 Thus, researching the long-term ef-
fects of child sexual abuse has proven more elusive than the initial
consequences.
Yet, clearly identifiable effects have emerged. For example,
depression is the most commonly reported effect of child sexual
abuse.u Some other documented long-term effects include: anxi-
ety, eating disorders, disassociation, feelings of isolation and stig-
matization, low self-esteem, failed interpersonal relationships, lack
of trust, fear, poor parenting skills, vulnerability and revictimiza-
tion, sexual dysfunction, prostitution, ° drug and alcohol abuse,
and suicidal tendencies.3
While it is essential to comprehend the short and long-term ef-
fects of child sexual abuse, this knowledge only serves as a starting
point for attaining a full understanding of the delayed discovery
rule. Therefore, in order to completely comprehend the delayed
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. Id.; see also Judith L. Herman & Mary R. Harvey, The False Memory Debate:
Social Science or Social Backlash?, 9 HARV. MENTAL HEALTH LErrER 4, 5 (1993) (dis-
cussing key periods in a survivor's life at which time memories may be recalled).
29. See Browne & Finkelhor, supra note 17, at 152.
30. See id. at 152-62 (describing the detrimental mental health effects of
sexual abuse); see also Conroy, supra note 17, at 256 (summarizing symptoms sex-
ual abuse victims often develop years after the abuse has ended). Dr. Judith
Herman's research concluded that 60% of adult female survivors of incest suf-
fered from major depression, 55% suffered from sexual dysfunction, 39% at-
tempted suicide, and 35% abused drugs and/or alcohol. See Browne & Finkel-
hor, supra note 17, at 154, 159, 162.
31. A 1981 study found that 60% of the prostitutes interviewed had been
sexually abused before age 16. See Browne & Finkelhor, supra note 17, at 161 (cit-
ing M.H. Silbert & A.M. Pines, Sexual Child Abuse as an Antecedent to Prostitution, 5
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 407, 407-11 (1981)). On average, two persons abused
these young women for 20-month time periods. See id. Women who were sexually
abused as children are at a greater risk of contracting the HIV virus because of
their disproportionately high rate of sexual promiscuity. See Gordon, supra note
1, at 1405; cf Browne & Finkelhor, supra note 17, at 160-61 (noting that "promis-
cuity" may be a self-description regarding esteem, as opposed to actual frequency
of sexual activity or partners).
[Vol. 23
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discovery rule's development, one must also consider how a victim
recovers from child sexual abuse.
C. Recovery and the Repressed-Memory Debate
According to Minnesota psychologist Mic Hunter, recovery
from childhood sexual abuse occurs over five phases of grieving.
They are (1) denial, (2) bargaining, (3) anger, (4) sadness, and (5)
acceptance or forgiveness.32 Because most survivors of childhood
sexual abuse tend to deny not that the abusive act occurred - but
that the abuse is important? - most survivors are unable to recog-
nize the causal connection between the abuse and their subsequent
psychological injuries, despite their awareness that the abuse was34
wrong. It is not until the survivor is able to become angry at his or
her abuser that he or she is able to acknowledge the cause-and-
35effect relationship between the past abuse and the present injury.
Because anger occurs once the survivor "acknowledges not only
that something happened but that it was abusive and harmedhi,16,,31
him, anger has been coined the "backbone of healing." 7
The denial phase presents the greatest obstacle to a victim's
ability to recover and heal. "Denial is 'accomplished by withhold-
ing conscious understanding of the meaning and implications of
what is perceived."'38 The most extreme form of denial is repres-
sion.39 Freud hypothesized that repression was an intentional pro-
cess, allowing a person to preserve his or her sanity when con-
fronted with a traumatic event by consciously pushing the memory
of the event out of the conscious mind.
32. HUNTER, supra note 24, at 99.
33. See Gelinas, supra note 16, at 316.
34. See Denise M. DeRose, Adult Incest Survivors and the Statute of Limitations:
The Delayed Discovery Rule and Long-Term Damages, 25 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 191, 196
(1985).
35. See HUNTER, supra note 24, at 106.
36. Id.
37. E. BASS & L. DAVIS, THE COURAGE To HEAL: A GUIDE FOR WOMEN
SURVIVORS OF CHILD SExuAL ABUSE 133-43 (1994).
38. Rebecca L. Thomas, Adult Survivors of Childhood Sexual Abuse and Statute
of Limitations: A Call for Legislative Action, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REv., 1245, 1254 n.74
(1991); see also HUNTER, supra note 24, at 28 (stating that those "who are not ready
to deal with sexual abuse will merely deny or repress information that is too
threatening for them to be aware of").
39. See DR. ELIZABETH LOFTUs & KATHERINE KETCHAM, THE MYrH OF
REPRESSED MEMORY 49 (1994). Repression has been called "the most haunting and
romantic of concepts in the psychology of memory." Id.
40. See id.; see also Linda Grant, Beyond Belief THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 14, 1996,
1997]
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Today, many proponents of the authenticity of repressed
memories deviate from Freud's theory. They instead hypothesize
that repression is an unconscious defense mechanism.4 ' Regardless
of whether repression is a conscious or unconscious act, advocates
of the Incest Survivor Movement" adamantly believe that repres-
sion is rampant.43 The founders of this movement further insist
that the abuse's impact can only be accessed through some "trig-
gering event," which overcomes the survivor's entrenched repres-
sion.44 The ability of a person to repress the impact of one's vic-
timization, however, is a concept of extreme debate that has
polarized the mental health community. 4 The apex of the debate
is whether repressed memories of childhood sexual abuse are reli-
able.46 Accordingly, a review of these positions is required.
1. The Doubters of the Authenticity of Repressed Memories
Those who doubt the authenticity of repressed memories base
their strongest argument on studies that have shown that it is feasi-
ble to implant entirely false memories into the subconscious of a47
person. Elizabeth Loftus, a renowned memory expert, conducted
an experiment where her research group attempted to implant an
early memory of getting lost in a shopping mall in one of each
at T22 ("Freud arrived at the belief that adults repressed memories of childhood
masturbation out of shame and 'reworked' the recollection in the unconscious
41. See LoFrus & KETCHAM, supra note 39, at 51. Repression is accomplished
"upon the occurrence of a shocking or traumatic event.... by pushing the mem-
ory of the event to the unconscious, where it may stay for an indefinite period of
time. Childhood sexual abuse is 'especially conducive to repression of memory of
the incident.'" Conroy, supra note 17, at 257 (quoting Gary M. Ernsdorff & Eliza-
beth F. Loftus, Let Sleeping Memories Lie? Words of Caution About Tolling the Statute of
Limitations in Cases of Memory Repression, 84J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 129 (1993)).
42. This movement holds as one of its fundamental tenets that victims
should sue sexual abusers as a "political statement" against society's years of failing
to believe women and children. See Carol Ness, Legal Challenge: Suits Over Incest,
S.F. EXAMINER, Apr. 7, 1993, at Al, A14.
43. See LoFrus & KETCHAM, supra note 39, at 144-48. Male survivors are par-
ticularly prone to denial and repression because "American society teaches men
that they are the strong ones and are responsible for everything that happens to
them, which gives men little permission to see themselves as having been victim-
ized." HUNTER, supra note 24, at 93-94.
44. See Gelinas, supra note 16, at 317-18.
45. SeeCLAUDETTEWASSIL-GRIMM, DIAGNOSIS FOR DISASTER 1 (1995).
46. See id. at 127.
47. See Lisa Atkins, Remembered Memories... True or False? - Should the Discov-
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member's relatives.48 The researchers simply wrote to relatives and
asked if they "still remembered the time they were lost in the
mall." 9 The researchers provided only sketchy details, but many of
the relatives, over time, recalled very detailed "memories" of the
event."' One subject developed vivid memories, even describing in
great detail the man who rescued him." Relying on Loftus' finding
that false memories can be implanted, those opposed to the re-
pressed memory theory suggest that a person who is told recovery
depends upon remembering will be "highly motivated to comply.
52
Another argument that the doubters proffer is that the list of
potential "symptoms" of childhood sexual abuse, which therapists
present to clients, are everyday complaints that nearly every Ameri-
can suffers. For instance, supporters state that "[i]f you think you
were abused and your life shows the symptoms, then you were
[abused] .,5 The following questions set forth some of the possible
symptoms of childhood sexual abuse: (1) Do you have trouble
knowing what you want? (2) Are you afraid to try new experiences?
(3) If someone gives you a suggestion, do you feel you ought to fol-
low it? (4) Do you follow other people's suggestions as if they were
orders to be observed? 4
Other symptoms indicative of past childhood sexual abuse in-
clude recurring nightmares, difficulty falling asleep, an ability to be
startled easily, daydreaming, lack of motivation, and feelings of the
need to be perfect 5' Because most everyone could say "yes" to at
least one of these "symptoms," the doubters question the credibility
of repressed memories.
As a final note, because most victims of child sexual abuse
48. See WASSiL-GRIMM, supra note 45, at 131.
49. Id.
50. See id. at 132.
51. See id.
52. Id.
53. LorusU& KETCHAM, supra note 39, at 152.
54. See JOHN BRADSHAW, HOMECOMING: RECLAIMING AND CHAMPIONING YOUR
INNER CHILD 106-07 (1990).
55. See RENEE FREDRICKSON, REPRESSED MEMORIES: A JOURNEY TO RECOVERY
FROM SEXUAL ABUSE 48-51 (1992). Survivors of Incest Anonymous provides its
members the following questions, which are intended to reveal abuse:
Do you feel you have to control your emotions? Currently, do you over-
react or misdirect your anger in situations that frustrate you? Are you
afraid of anger? Do you have blocks of your childhood you can't re-
member? ... Do you have a problem with alcohol, drugs, food, mi-
graines, or back pain?
Lorus & KETCHAM, supra note 39, at 22.
1997]
9
Brown: Sometimes the Bad Guy Wins: Minnesota's Delayed Discovery Rule
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1997
WILLIAM MITCHELL LA W REVIEW
never forget about the abuse and find little benefit in talking about
it, 6 the enthusiasm with which persons of newly-recalled memories
speak about the abuse raises more suspicion. Melody Gavigan,
editor of The Retractor's and former claimant of repressed child sex-
ual abuse memories, made the following observation while she her-
self was in therapy: " [W] omen without any memories of abuse
seemed more ill and dysfunctional than the ones who had always
known about their abuse. I watched with fascination as many of
these women then entered therapy to gain memories, and each be-
came increasingly disturbed. 59 Thus, while no one disputes the se-
riousness and severity of abuse victims' emotional scars, their sus-
ceptibility to suggestive creation causes many to look upon these
memories with skepticism.
2. The Proponents' Response
While the validity of one's repressed memories should always
be closely scrutinized, studies show that there is far less evidence of
suggestive creation of these memories than opponents of the de-
layed discovery rule would like to acknowledge. According to re-
searcherJudith Herman, false complaints are rare, comprising only
two to eight percent of all reported cases.6 ° Moreover, Herman
found that of the fifty-three women she worked with who reported
delayed recall of abuse, seventy-four percent obtained corroborat-
ing evidence for the abuse, either through the admissions of family
members or physical evidence of the abuse.1 More importantly,
only six percent of Herman's patients could not find sufficient evi-
62dence to support their claims of abuse. Finally, Herman con-
cludes that repressed memories are not so absurd, considering that
adults who were treated for sexual abuse as children often do not
56. See WASSIL-GRIMM, supra note 45, at 8, 55-56; see also Gelinas, supra note
16, at 316.
57. See WASsIL-GRIMM, supra note 45, at 55-56.
58. The Retractor is a newsletter for persons who allege that their mental
health therapists pressured and induced them into falsely believing that they suf-
fered from repressed memories of childhood sexual abuse. See Sally Jacobs,
Memories in Question, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 4, 1993, at 1. Melody Gavigan founded
the national newsletter in 1992 after she concluded that her therapist led her to
believe mistakenly that her father had raped her. Id.
59. WASSIL-GRIMM, supra note 45, at 56.
60. See Herman & Harvey, supra note 26, at 5.
61. See id.
62. See id. However, Herman admits that more research is needed. See id.
[Vol. 23
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recall the details documented in their own childhood hospital rec-
ords.3
Numerous reports document examples of sexual abuse victims
who identify a period of time during which they did not remember
their abuse.6 A 1993 study of 196 college undergraduates revealed
that half of the twelve percent reporting childhood abuse indicated
a period during which they did not remember their abuse. 65 An-
other study reported that nearly sixty percent of 450 female sexual
abuse survivors experienced amnesia regarding their first instance
66of abuse at some time prior to age eighteen.
Repressed memory activists further support their position by
explaining that remembering the abuse is the first step toward• 61
healing. California attorney Shari Karney, one of the premier ad-
vocates for adult survivors of childhood sexual abuse,68 addresses
survivors' need to talk about abuse as a response to a "conspiracy of
silence."69 According to Karney's colleague, family and child coun-
selor Arlene Drake, society seems to feel that talking about sexual
abuse is a crime because, ironically, it damages the family unit.7°Another of Karney's colleagues, attorney Mary Williams, explains
63. See id. (citing a study of 200 adults performed by Linda Meyer Williams
of the Family Violence Research Laboratory at the University of New Hampshire,
which found that one in three could not recall the specifics of the abusive acts).
64. See D. Stephen Lindsay & J. Don Read, "Memory Work" and Recovered
Memories of Childhood Sexual Abuse: Scientific Evidence and Public, Professional and Per-
sonal Issues, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y& L. 846, 854-62 (1995). Lindsay and Read use
the term hidden memories rather than repressed memories "to refer to autobiographi-
cal information in memory that is not consciously accessible but that might be re-
trieved given the appropriate cues and procedures." Id. at 846 n.1.
65. SeeJ.A. Sheiman, "I Have Always Wondered if Something Happened to Me":
Assessment of Child Sexual Abuse Survivors with Amnesia, 2 J. CHILD SEx. ABUSE 13, 17
(1993). Another seven percent reported no discovered abuse and yet they won-
dered whether they had been victimized. Both of these groups scored similarly
on the Dissociative Experiences Scale. Dissociation is strongly correlated with
childhood trauma. Id. at 15.
66. See John Briere & Jon Conte, Self-Reported Amnesia for Abuse in Adults Mo-
lested as Children, 6J. OFTRAUMATIC STRESS 21, 26 (1993).
67. See FREDRICKSON, supra note 55, at 29-31.
68. Karney represented Mary Doe in the landmark California case, Mary D.
v. John D., in which the California Court of Appeals held that because Mary did
not recall repressed memories of childhood sexual abuse until after the statute of
limitations had run, she could sue based on the delayed discovery rule. 264 Cal.
Rptr. 633, 645 (Ct. App. 1989).
69. Kathleen Hendrix, Challenge to Child Abuse; Court Case Widens Options for
Adults Seeking Redress, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1989, at 1. Karney claims to have re-
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an abused person's need to talk about abuse as an "expression of
standing up as an adult to this person who abused them. It repre-
sents the whole world of people they could not stand up to. It's an
experience of getting out of the victim psychology."71 Proponents,
therefore, point to statistics and the healing potential of addressing
the memories to support their belief in the authenticity of re-
pressed memories.
III. MINNESOTA'S DELAYED DISCOVERY RULE
AND ITS CIRCUITOUS DEVELOPMENT
The delayed discovery rule started as a judicially-created doc-
trine that allows a statute of limitations to be extended in cases
where the injured party was "blamelessly ignorant" of the injury un-
til after its cause occurred and after the statute of limitations had
run. It has been used in a variety of contexts, including medical
malpractice," libel,4 invasion of privacy,75 negligent prescription of
drugs,76 and negligent breach of contract.
7
A. Historical Roots of the Delayed Discovery Rule
The United States Supreme Court first applied the delayed
discovery rule in Urie v. Thompson. The petitioner, a fireman on
steam locomotives for the Missouri Pacific Railroad, was forced to
leave his thirty-year position after being diagnosed with silicosis, a
pulmonary disease caused by continuous inhalation of silica dust. 9
71. Id.
72. Johnson v. Johnson, 701 F. Supp. 1363, 1364 (N.D. Ill. 1988); see also
Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 170 (1949) (holding an injured party's "blame-
less ignorance" should not bar cause of action, despite the expiration of the stat-
ute of limitations).
73. See, e.g., Huysman v. Kirsch, 57 P.2d 908, 913 (Cal. 1936); see also Doe v.
First United Methodist Church, 629 N.E.2d 402, 408 (Ohio 1994) (citing the ap-
plication of the delayed discovery rule to medical and legal malpractice, injuries
caused by asbestos exposure, and DES-related injuries).
74. See, e.g., Manguso v. Oceanside Unified Sch. Dist., 152 Cal. Rptr. 27, 31
(Ct. App. 1979).
75. See, e.g., Cain v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 132 Cal. Rptr. 860, 862-
63 (Ct. App. 1976).
76. See, e.g., Warrington v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 80 Cal. Rptr. 130, 133-34
(Ct. App. 1969).
77. See, e.g., Allred v. Bekins Wide World Van Servs., 45 Cal. App. 3d 984,
989-91 (Ct. App. 1975).
78. 337 U.S. 163 (1949).
79. See id. at 165-66.
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The petitioner filed suit against the trustee of the railroad under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act a and then, by amended com-
plaint, under the Boiler Inspection Act.81
Because the petitioner first inhaled the dust in 1910, the
Court's first question was whether the statute of limitations for such
acts barred the claim. 2 After considering the congressional pur-
pose of the statutes, the Court held that Urie's claim against his
empioyer was not time-barred, stating:
If Urie were held barred from prosecuting this ac-
tion... [i] t would mean that at some past moment in
time, unknown and inherently unknowable even in retro-
spect, Urie was charged with knowledge of the slow and
tragic disintegration of his lungs, under this view Urie's fail-
ure to diagnose within the applicable statute of limitations
a disease whose symptoms had not yet obtruded on his
consciousness would constitute waiver of his right to com-
pensation at the ultimate day of discovery and disability."
3
In Urie, the Supreme Court emphasized the petitioner's
knowledge of the resulting injury - not the petitioner's knowledge
of the employer's act (that being its failure to protect the petitioner
from the danger) .4 As will be shown, this distinction becomes im-
portant when applying delayed discovery statutes in relation to
sexual abuse cases.
B. Application of the Delayed Discovery Rule to Sexual Abuse Cases: From
a Narrow Judicial Beginning Toward a Broader Legislative Purpose
In response to the Incest Recovery Movement, the legal com-
munity has revisited the delayed discovery rule and its application
to sexual abuse cases. As a result, many states have enacted "de-
layed discovery" statutes of limitations. 85 These statutes typically
possess two components. The first is the length of time a claimant
has to commence an action. 6 The second is identifying the event
80. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1939) (commonly referred to now as the "Employer's
Liability Act").
81. See Urie, 337 U.S. at 167. The Boiler Inspection Act is codified at 45
U.S.C. § 23 (1994).
82. See Urie, 337 U.S. at 168.
83. Id. at 169 (emphasis added). The Court's holding was based on peti-
tioner's "blameless ignorance." Id. at 170.
84. See id. at 170-71.
85. See infra notes 86-90.
86. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577d (West 1992) (17 years after
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that triggers the running of the limitation period. Some statutes
commence upon discovery of the abuse. 7 Other statutes com-
mence upon discovery of the injury.s Still others open the window
to litigation by allowing a person to sue when the individual real-
izes that the abuse suffered as a child caused the emotional and
psychological injuries from which -he or she now suffers as an
adult.89 Statutorily, Minnesota falls into this last group. 90
An understanding of Minnesota's current version of the de-
layed discovery statute requires a survey of how other states have
acted. Specifically, an understanding of Washington and Califor-
nia's treatment of this issue is imperative, since their experiences
shaped the rule that Minnesota ultimately adopted.9'
1. Initial Defeat in the Courts for the Delayed Discovery Rule
The first case in which a court contemplated the applicability
reaching age of majority); IDAHO CODE § 6-1704 (1990) (five years after reaching
age of majority); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13-202.2(b) (West Supp. 1996) (two
years); IOWA CODE ANN. § 614.8A (West Supp. 1996) (four years); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 9:2800.9 (West Supp. 1997) (10 years after reaching majority); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 752-C (West Supp. 1996) (12 years or six years); MO. ANN.
STAT. § 537.046(2) (West Supp. 1996) (five years or three years); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-12-25.1(2) (West Supp. 1996) (four years); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 522(a)
(Supp. 1996) (six years); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.587 (West 1997) (two years).
87. See, e.g., ARK. CODEANN. § 16-56-130 (Michie Supp. 1995) (limitation pe-
riod begins to run when victim knew or should have known of abuse); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-12-25.1(2) (limitation period begins to run when the victim turns 18 or
discovers the sexual abuse, whichever is later).
88. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13-202.2(b) (limitation period runs
from time injured party discovers or should have discovered, through reasonable
diligence, that he or she was injured); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 752-C (trigger-
ing the statute upon discovery of the action, if sexual intercourse or sexual act, or
discovery of the harm, whichever is later).
89. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 614.8A (beginning statute at the time of dis-
covery of both the injury and the causal relationship between the injury and the
abuse); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.046(2) (running time upon reaching the age of ma-
jority or when plaintiff realizes or should have realized that the injuries were
caused by the abuse, whichever occurs later); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 522(a) (ini-
tiating statute when the victim discovers the abuse or that the injury or condition
was caused by the act, whichever is later); VA. CODE. ANN. § 8.01-249(6) (Michie
Supp. 1996) (starting the limitation period when the fact of the injury and its
causal connection to the sexual abuse is first communicated to the person by a
licensed physician, psychologist, or clinical psychologist); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
893.587 (commencing statute when the victim discovers or should have discov-
ered the abuse and that the abuse caused the injury).
90. See MINN. STAT. § 541.073 (1996).
91. See David J. Schaibley, Legal and Scientific Discord: Supporting a Cause of
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of the delayed discovery rule to sexual abuse cases was Tyson v. Ty-
son. 2 In Tyson, the plaintiff alleged that her father compelled her
to engage in many different types of sexual activity when she was
between three and eleven years old, from 1960 to 1969). 9' The
plaintiff further averred that she had no memory of her father's
abuse until she started to receive psychological therapy in 1983 at
age twenty six. 94 Soon after recalling these memories, the plaintiff
filed suit against her father in federal court.95  The defendant
quickly moved for summary judgment, arguing that under Wash-
ington's discovery provisions her claim was statutorily barred.96
The court, unable to resolve the issue itself, certified the question
to the Supreme Court of Washington.97
The supreme court, in a short opinion, flatly rejected the
plaintiffs argument that the delayed discovery rule applied to her
claims.98 In fact, the court seemingly forbade the application of the
delayed discovery rule to any case that involved repressed memo-
ries of sexual abuse. 99 The court based its decision not to extend
the rule to these cases on essentially two grounds. First, the court
noted that the purpose of a statute of limitations is to prevent ei-
ther stale or illegitimate claims.'0° Second, the court relied on the
fact that it previously had created exceptions to statutes of limita-
tions only if "empirical evidence of the occurrence of the alleged
act... and of the resulting harm" justified tolling the statute. °
According to the court, repressed memory cases do not fall within
this category because they are subjective and, therefore, unverifi-
able, since the case hinges upon the "plaintiff's alleged recollection
92. 727 P.2d 226 (Wash. 1986).




97. Id. at 226-27.
98. Tyson, 727 P.2d at 227.
99. See id.
100. Id. at 227-28.
101. Id. at 228. The court, in supporting its position, cited examples of
plaintiffs presenting what the majority classified as "objective evidence." Id. This
included instances where patients later discovered their physicians left sponges in
their bodies, id. (citing Ruth v. Dight, 453 P.2d 631 (Wash. 1969)), and product
liability cases where liability arose from injuries resulting from asbestos exposure,
id. (citing Sahlie v. John-Mansville Sales Corp., 663 P.2d 473 (Wash. 1983)). The
court relied heavily on the fact that the source of the injury and the correspond-
ing harm "were objectively verifiable." Id.
1997]
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of a memory long buried in the unconscious.'
°02
The plaintiff responded to the court's position by asserting
that her claim, due to the presence of expert psychiatric testimony
that would support her contentions, possessed the requisite objec-
tive element.'0 3 The court, however, rejected outright the plaintiffs
position by reasoning that psychology and psychiatry are "impre-
cise disciplines[,] ... their methods of investigation are primarily
subjective[,] and most of their findings are not based on physically
observable evidence."'04 The court, therefore, held that as a matter
of law the plaintiffs claims began to accrue at the time she reached
majority. Thus, Washington's statute of limitations barred Tyson's
claim.
Soon after Tyson, the California Court of Appeals became the
second court to examine the application of the delayed discovery
rule in DeRose v. Carswel' 05 In DeRose, the plaintiff filed a complaint
in 1986 against her step-grandfather, alleging that he sexually
abused her from the time she was four years old until she was
eleven (from 1966 to 1973).06 The plaintiff claimed that although
she always remembered the abuse, her cause of action did not ac-
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Tyson, 727 P.2d at 228. Justice Pearson's dissenting opinion clearly re-
veals the inconsistencies in the majority opinion. He began his rebuttal by first
noting that "[flundamental fairness, not availability of objective evidence, has al-
ways been the linchpin of the discovery rule." Id. at 231 (Pearson,J., dissenting).
Justice Pearson further criticized the majority by arguing that any evidentiary con-
cerns were for the plaintiff, and not the court, to resolve. Id. According to Pear-
son, "it is illogical to foreclose a cause of action alleging sexual abuse just because
the parties' credibility will be determinative, when such 'swearing contests' are
common in other contexts." Id. at 232.
Of all of Pearson's arguments, his critique of the majority's characterization
of psychiatry and its usefulness in the courtroom is the most scathing. He first
noted that a psychotherapist's testimony, like all other expert testimony, is a le-
gitimate "aid to the trier of fact and may be accepted or rejected by the jury." Id.
at 233 (Pearson, J., dissenting) (citing Gerberg v. Crosby, 329 P.2d 184 (1958)).
Moreover, a trial court is capable of managing how ajury receives such testimony.
Id. at 233 (citing Marianne Wesson, Historical Truth, Narrative Truth, and Expert Tes-
timony, 60 WASH. L. REv. 331 (1985) (providing model jury instructions and en-
couraging the use of mental health testimony)). Pearson resoundingly ended his
critique by noting that not only have Washington's courts "relied on the expertise
of mental health professionals for many years in a wide range of contexts," but
even the United States Supreme Court "has recognized the validity of testimony
by mental health professionals." Id. at 233 (citing Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880
(1983)).
105. 242 Cal. Rptr. 368 (Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
106. Id. at 369-70.
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crue until 1985, when she recognized the causal connection be-
tween the abuse and her emotional injuries.10 7 The court held that
the delayed discovery rule did not apply because "[a]n as-
sault.. . causes harm as a matter of law."108 Thus, the DeRose rule
allowed an adult victim with no memory of the abuse only one year
from the time they recovered their memories in which to file their
claim.09 More importantly, if a victim were able to recall the abuse,
his or her claim was barred one year after the victim reached ma-
jority."0 Because the plaintiff had not repressed her memories of
the assaults, the court of appeals found that the statute of limita-
tions barred her claims as of 1981."'
107. Id.
108. Id. at 371.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 370-71.
111. DeRose, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 371. The court noted that the delayed discov-
ery rule applies only when a plaintiff does not discover all of the facts essential to
a cause of action. See id. The court reserved the question of whether the delayed
discovery rule would have applied if DeRose had repressed her memory of the
abuse. See id.
Other courts, when forced to consider this issue without legislative guid-
ance, have reached conclusions similar to the one in DeRose. For example, in
Johnson v. Johnson, 701 F. Supp. 1363 (N.D. Ill. 1988), a federal district court un-
dertook the onerous task of ascertaining how Illinois applied the delayed discov-
ery doctrine. In Johnson, the plaintiff filed a complaint against her parents, alleg-
ing that her father sexually abused her from the time she was approximately three
years old until she was 12 or 13, from 1958 to 1968. See id. at 1364-65. In contrast
to DeRose, this plaintiff alleged that she suppressed her memory of the abuse and
was "blamelessly ignorant" of the causal relationship between her father's abusive
acts and the emotional injuries from which she suffered as an adult. Id.
The Johnson court noted that the discovery rule is a judicially-created device
under which "the statute of limitations commences 'when the Plaintiff knew or
should have known that he was injured.'" Id. at 1367 (quoting Lincoln-Way
Community v. Village of Frankfort, 367 N.E.2d 318, 323-24 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977)).
The court also observed that, prior to this case, Illinois courts had not addressed
whether the discovery rule should toll the statute of limitations beyond the abuse
period for minors and allow adults to bring claims of incest against their abusers.
Id. The court noted that prior cases had fallen into two categories:
(1) those where the Plaintiff claimed she knew about the sexual assaults
at or before majority, but that she was unaware that other physical and
psychological problems were caused by the prior sexual abuse; and (2)
cases such as this one, where the Plaintiff claims due to the trauma of the
experience she had no recollection or knowledge of the sexual abuse
until shortly before she filed suit.
Id. Thus, in contrast to Uie's focus on the resulting injury, the court followed
DeRose and focused primarily on the abusive act. See id. at 1370. In considering
the facts at hand, the court determined that because there was a genuine question
of material fact as to when the plaintiff "knew or reasonably should have known"
that the abuse caused injury, the court had to deny Defendant's motion for sum-
1997]
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2. The Legislatures React
While initially it appeared that the Tyson/DeRose treatment of
the delayed discovery rule was taking hold nationally, legislatures
around the country soon interjected more liberal renditions of the
rule."2 Washington again acted first when, in 1988, the legislature
passed a statute permitting a plaintiff to recover if the individual
makes his or her claim within three years of discovering the act, or,
when the plaintiff realizes or should have realized that the abuse
caused his or her injuries.11 In codifying the delayed discovery
rule, the Washington Legislature expressed that it was clearing the
way for victims of child abuse to recover from their abusers even if
they had repressed the ability to recall the horrific events.1
4
The result of DeRose also proved unsavory for California's legis-
lature. Using the Washington model,"5 California and, later, Min-
nesota enacted their own statutes.' 6 In language almost identical
mary judgment. Id. Like Illinois, Florida and Pennsylvania courts have modeled
their delayed discovery rules after the Tyson and DeRose holdings. See Lindabury v.
Lindabury, 552 So. 2d 1117, 1117 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (refusing to reinter-
pret Florida's statute of limitations without some legislative guidance); Bowser v.
Guttendorf, 541 A.2d 377, 381 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (barring claim when reason-
able person would have been aware of injuries flowing from abuse).
112. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 9.10.140 (Michie 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
523 (1994); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 260, § 4C (West Supp. 1997); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 537.046 (West Supp. 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-216 (1995); NEv.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 11.215 (Michie 1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 95(6) (West
Supp. 1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 12.117 (Supp. 1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-51 (Supp.
1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 26-10-25 (Michie Supp. 1996);VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §
522 (Supp. 1996).
113. SeeWASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.16.340 (West Supp. 1997).
114. See 1991 Wash. Legis. Serv. 212 (West). In 1991, in response to growing
confusion over the meaning of its recently enacted discovery rule, the legislature
added the following findings to its clarifying amendment:
The legislature enacted RCW 4.16.340 to clarify the application of the
discovery rule to childhood sexual abuse cases. At that time the legisla-
ture intended to reverse the Washington Supreme Court decision in Ty-
son v. Tyson.
It is still the legislature's intention that Tyson v. Tyson be reversed, as
well as the line of cases that state that discovery of any injury whatsoever
caused by an act of childhood sexual abuse commences the statute of
limitations. The legislature intends that the earlier discovery of less seri-
ous injuries should not affect the statute of limitations for injuries that
are discovered later.
Id. (citations omitted).
115. See Schaibley, supra note 91, at 170.
116. See CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 340.1 (West Supp. 1997); MINN. STAT. §
541.07 (1996). Illinois law now triggers the tolling of the limitations period when
the plaintiff discovers (or reasonably should have discovered) the act and the
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to Washington and Minnesota's provisions, California's delayed
discovery statute states:
In any civil action for recovery of damages suffered as a
result of childhood sexual abuse, the time for com-
mencement of the action shall be within eight years of the
date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within
three years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasona-
bly should have discovered that psychological injury or
illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by
the sexual abuse, whichever... period expires later."1
7
causal connection between the abusive acts and the current injuries. See 735 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/13-202.2(b) (West Supp. 1996). Specifically, the key portion of the
statute provides that the plaintiff must file suit when "the person abused discovers
or through the use of reasonable diligence should discover that the act of child-
hood sexual abuse occurred and that the injury was caused by the childhood sex-
ual abuse." Id. (emphasis added). While the Johnson case evidences a require-
ment that the victim repress the memory of the abuse, recent cases evidence the
legislature's desire to allow victims more latitude to recover. See D.P. v. MJ.O.,
640 N.E.2d 1323 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (tolling limitation period even though plain-
tiff had memories of the abuse, until he had knowledge of the causal connection
between the acts and his present injuries). But see M.E.H. v. L.H., 669 N.E.2d
1228, 1236 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (holding that the delayed discovery rule does not
apply when a "plaintiff alleges that she repressed the conscious awareness of sex-
ual abuse as a child and remembered it years later. Since the injury is immediate
and caused by external force or violence, we believe sexual abuse is a traumatic
event[,] [and since a traumatic event imputes knowledge of the event,] [t]he dis-
covery rule does not extend the statute of limitations period in such cases.").
117. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.1 (West Supp. 1997); cf MINN. STAT. §
541.07 (1996). Wisconsin deviates from a majority of the nation with its unique
application of the rule. The rule, now in statutory form, is a product of the Wis-
consin Court of Appeals' decision in Hammer v. Hammer, 418 N.W.2d 23 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1987). There the plaintiff filed a complaint against her father in the mid-
1980s, alleging incestuous abuse from when she was five years old until she was
fifteen (1969-1978). Id. at 24. The plaintiff further alleged that the abuse caused
her such psychological distress that she ultimately adopted coping mechanisms
that precluded her from knowing the existence or nature of her emotional inju-
ries. Id. at 25. It was not until 1985 that, through the help of her psychological
counselor, she slowly discerned the cause of her psychological and emotional
problems. See id.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, but
the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding: "as a matter of
law ... a cause of action for incestuous abuse will not accrue until the victim discov-
ers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the fact
and cause of the injury." Id. at 26. The court based its conclusion on a balancing
of the plaintiff's and defendant's interests, deciding that "'the injustice of barring
meritorious claims before the claimant knows of the injury outweighs the threat of
stale or fraudulent actions.'" Id. at 27 (quoting Hansen v. A.H. Robins, Inc., 335
N.W.2d 578, 582 (Wis. 1983)). Thus, in contrast to other states, the court limited
the application of the delayed discovery rule by controlling the type of abuse it
applies to, rather than when the abuse occurred.
1997]
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Thus, Washington's and California's provisions currently toll
the limitation period when a victim remembers the abuse, but does
not become aware of the resulting injury until some later time.""
This result is what Minnesota's drafters surely intended: a standard
that provides for having knowledge or memory of the abuse but
not making the causal connection to injuries suffered as an adult.
Unfortunately, the Minnesota Supreme Court failed to take notice
of this fact.
Washington's and California's experiences are insightful for
two reasons. First, the California and Minnesota statutes are simi-
lar in text: Both statutes suspend the limitation period contingent
upon the victim discovering that the cause of her or his injuries
stems from the abuse. Thus, it is expected that the courts inter-
preting their respective laws would reach similar conclusions. Yet,
this is not the case. The question then becomes whose interpreta-
tion is erroneous. As discussed earlier, the early DeRose decision,
which is similar to Blackowiak, was subsequently rejected through leg-
In the same year as the Hammer decision, Wisconsin's legislature enacted a
statute that reflected Hammers unique holding. The provision states:
An action to recover damages for injury caused by incest shall be com-
menced within 2 years after the plaintiff discovers the fact and the prob-
able cause, or with the exercise of reasonable diligence should have dis-
covered the fact and the probable cause, of the injury, whichever occurs
first.
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 893.587 (West 1996). Since the Hammer decision in 1987, the
Wisconsin courts have emphasized that Hammer and section 893.587 of Wisconsin
Statutes apply only to incest cases. See, e.g., Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee,
533 N.W.2d 780, 788 (Wis. 1995); Byrne v. Bercker, 501 N.W.2d 402, 408 (Wis.
1993). In so doing, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has based its limited applica-
tion of the Hammer rule on "the unique harms and relationships between the tort-
feasor and victims which exist in cases of incest." Pritzlaff, 533 N.W.2d at 788. The
court has identified what it perceives as some of the unique harms - namely, the
secrecy, the threats of harm, the blaming, and the abuse of authority. See id.
This rationale is repeated in Petersen v. Bruen, wherein the Nevada Supreme
Court stated that victims of childhood sexual abuse should not be "sacrificed for a
policy disfavoring stale claims or the disturbance of abusers who have grown ac-
customed to living free of concern over an eventual day of reckoning with their
victims." 792 P.2d 18, 23 (Nev. 1990).
118. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.1 (West Supp. 1997); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 4.16.40 (West Supp. 1997); Sellery v. Cressey, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 706, 711 (Ct.
App. 1996) (citing the California Assembly Judiciary Committee's purpose for
amending the statute in 1990). Recently, the California Court of Appeals held
that repression of memories is not a prerequisite to triggering a tolling of the
limitation period. See Lent v. Doe, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 389, 389 (Ct. App. 1995).
Rather, all that is required is a showing that the plaintiff suffered psychological
injury or illness "after reaching majority and that he commenced the action
within three years of the time he discovered or reasonably should have discovered
such psychological injury or illness was caused by the childhood sexual abuse." Id.
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islative action. It is clear that both holdings are not only similar,
they are at odds with current statutory language.
C. Minnesota's Codification of the Delayed Discovery Rule
In Minnesota, torts resulting in personal injury generally carry
a two-year statute of limitations. 9 However, in 1989, State Repre-
sentative Randy Kelly introduced a bill to create a special statute of
limitations for cases of sexual abuse.12° Representative Kelly intro-
duced the bill in response to the Attorney General's Task Force on
the Prevention of Sexual Violence Against Women. 2 ' The bill ad-
dressed the conclusions of the task force report - namely, that vic-
tims and survivors of sexual abuse often do not recognize that the
abuse occurs or do not discover their psychological injuries until
many years after the abuse. 12 '2 The purpose of the bill was to amend
the statute of limitations for sexual abuse cases so that it would be-
gin to run (1) when the abuse was committed, or (2) at the time
the victim knew or had reason to know that the injury was caused
by sexual abuse - whichever is later.22  The bill was enacted as
Minnesota Statutes section 541.073.124
Originally, the statute provided a two-year statute of limitation
if the sexual abuse was classified as an intentional tort and a six-
year statute of limitation if the abuse was classified as negligence.12
However, in 1991, the legislature amended the statute by deleting
the distinction between cases of intentional tort and negligence. 6
Today, the "delayed discovery rule" provides:
An action for damages based on personal injury caused by
sexual abuse must be commenced within six years of the
time the plaintiff knew or had reason to know that the in-
119. SeeMINN. STAT. § 541.07 (1996).
120. Tape of Legislative Proceedings, Criminal Justice Div. of the House Ju-
diciary Comm. of the Minn. House of Representatives, H.F. No. 461 (Feb. 28,
1989) (tape on file at the Minnesota Legislative Library).
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. Tape of Legislative Proceedings, Minn. House of Representatives (Mar.
13, 1989) (tape on file at the Minnesota Legislative Library).
124. See Act of May 19, 1989, ch. 190, § 2, 1989 Minn. Laws 485, 486-87
(codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 541.073 (1996)).
125. See MINN. STAT. § 541.073 (1990), amended by Act of May 28, 1991, ch.
232, § 1, 1991 Minn. Laws 629, 629.
126. See Act of May 28, 1991, ch. 232, § 1, 1991 Minn. Laws 629, 629 (codi-
fied at MiNN. STAT. § 541.073, subd. 2 (1992)).
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jury was caused by the sexual abuse.
Under the statute, to determine when the statute of limitations has
or will run in cases of childhood sexual abuse, the critical fact ques-
tion is: WMen did the victim know or have reason to know the sexual abuse
caused injury.?" Nevertheless, the Minnesota Supreme Court has
misinterpreted the statute to frame the pertinent question as: When
did the victim know or have reason to know he or she was being sexually
abused ?29
D. The Minnesota Supreme Court Stunts the Delayed Discovery Rule
1. Delayed Discovery Rule Prior to Blackowiak v. Kemp
The Minnesota Court of Appeals has considered the delayed
discovery rule only a handful of times. 30 Generally, the court has
focused not on the act, but the resulting injury. In conformity with
this focus, the court has taken great care to allow for a tolling of
the statute of limitations until the injured party recognizes the
causal connection between the abusive act(s) and the resulting in-
jury.' 3' The court, however, acknowledged the need to maintain
some control over the tolling of the statute of limitations. Thus, to
rein in plaintiffs, the courts have interpreted the statute to require
an objective inquiry into whether the delayed recognition of the
cause of the party's injuries was reasonable.'32 This interpretation
127. MINN. STAT. § 541.073 (1996).
128. See M.L. v. Magnuson, 531 N.W.2d 849, 855 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
This question of when a reasonable person in the claimant's position should have
known that his injuries were caused by sexual abuse requires an objective inquiry
and is normally a question of fact for the jury. See id.; see also Roe v. Archdiocese
of St. Paul & Minneapolis, 518 N.W.2d 629, 632-33 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (affirm-
ing summaryjudgment where a reasonable person should have realized he or she
was being abused); ABC v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, 513 N.W.2d
482, 487 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that where there is overwhelming evi-
dence that a reasonable person should have known he or she was abused, sum-
maryjudgment is appropriate).
129. See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 128.
131. See Roe, 518 N.W.2d at 631 (stating that "the limitations period begins
to run when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know that an injury was caused by
sexual abuse, rather than when the abuse actually occurred").
132. See id. at 632 (holding that the statute is not tolled if an adult victim
suppresses memories of abuse after recognizing she has been injured by abuse);
see also S.E. v. Shattuck-St. Mary's Sch., 533 N.W.2d 628, 632 (Minn. Ct. App.
1995) (stating that a subjective test would elicit a "flood of claims," and requiring
an objective inquiry). But see Conroy, supra note 17, at 267-78 (criticizing the Roe
decision for not tolling the limitations period when the victim subsequently re-
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of Minnesota Statutes section 541.073 prevailed until the Minne-
sota Supreme Court completely changed the focus from recogni-
tion of the resulting injury to knowledge of the abusive act when it
ruled in the case of Blackowiak v. Kemp.
33
2. Blackowiak v. Kemp
a. Background
In Blackowiak, a junior high school counselor sexually abused
the plaintiff when the plaintiff was eleven years old. 34 The abuse
occurred in either 1970 or 1971 and included oral and anal inter-
course.' At the time of the abuse, the plaintiff warned a friend to
stay away from the counselor and told his mother the counselor
was doing something "wrong" to him. Yet, during this time he
could not acknowledge that he was the victim of sexual abuse.
After the abuse, the plaintiff was "excessively truant, became
involved with crime, and abused drugs and alcohol."3 7 His prob-
lems developed slowly over time. 38 The plaintiff saw several coun-
selors, but he was unable to discuss the abuse because of his feel-
ings of guilt and shame)3 9 In 1991, the plaintiff had a conversation
with a fellow seventh-grade student from 1970, who told the plain-
tiff the counselor had abused him.' 4° According to the plaintiff,
this conversation enabled him to realize that his psychological inju-
ries were the result of the past abuse.14' He consequently brought
suit against his abuser. The trial court, however, granted summary
judgment in favor of the counselor, concluding that even in light
of Minnesota's delayed discovery rule, the law barred his claim. 
42
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, distinguishing
Blackowiak from Roe and other similar cases where there was "over-
whelming evidence" that the plaintiffs knew the abuse caused them
presses memories of the abuse).
133. 546 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1996).
134. Blackowiak v. Kemp, 528 N.W.2d 247, 249 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995), rev'd,
546 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1996).
135. Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 2.
136. Id.
137. Blackowiak, 528 N.W.2d at 249.
138. Id. at 252.
139. Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 2.





Brown: Sometimes the Bad Guy Wins: Minnesota's Delayed Discovery Rule
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1997
W!LL!AM MITCHELL LA W REVIEW
injury much earlier than they claimed. 43  The court of appeals
cited the gradual manifestation of the plaintiff's injuries and his
psychological, rather than physical, 4 4 injuries as the primary distin-
guishing features of his case.4 5 The court of appeals concluded
that "reasonable persons could find that [the plaintiff] did not
have reason to know of the cause of his injuries until his conversa-
tion with [the classmate] in 1991.,,146
b. The Minnesota Supreme Court's Holding and Reasoning
Affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment, the su-
preme court instructed that the inquiry is not "when did the victim
'acknowledge' or 'appreciate' the nature and extent of the harm
resulting from the abuse," but rather when "the complainant knew
or should have known that he was sexually abused."4 7 Thus, in one
sentence, the supreme court rendered the delayed discovery statute
virtually useless.
The court then turned to the case before it to demonstrate just
how ineffectual the delayed discovery rule had become. The court
ruled that because the plaintiff knew at age eleven that he was be-
ing abused, he also understood, as a matter of law, that the abuse was
causing him injury.'4 The supreme court further stated that the
plaintiffs feelings of shame provided additional evidence that he
knew, at the time the abuse was occurring, that he was injured. 149
Because the six-year statute of limitations expired while the plain-
tiff was seventeen and still a minor, he therefore had only until his
nineteenth birthday (in 1978 or 1979) to file suit. Hence, the
court held that the plaintiffs 1992 complaint was time-barred.5 °
143. Id. at 251-52.
144. Cf Roe, 518 N.W.2d at 631 (indicating that the abuse manifested in
physical injuries where Roe attempted suicide with a razor blade and engaged in
self-mutilation). In ABC v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, a case the Blacko-
wiak court also cites, the plaintiff suffered physical injuries when ABC became
pregnant and then suffered a miscarriage. 513 N.W.2d 482, 488 (Minn. Ct. App.
1994).
145. Blackowiak, 528 N.W.2d at 252-53.
146. Id. at 253.
147. Blackowiak v. Kemp, 546 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn. 1996).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See id. Justice Sandra Gardebring filed a dissenting opinion, which be-
gins with a most poignant statement: "The majority, by its decision today, would
have us equate a moral knowledge of wrongdoing with the legal concept of
knowledge of causation of injury." Id. (Gardebring, J., dissenting). The dissent
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3. Post-Blackowiak World
Following Blackowiak, the Minnesota Court of Appeals re-
viewed the Roseau County case of Gibbons v. Krowech."' In Gibbons,
a neighbor sexually abused two brothers when they were between
the ages of five and ten.'52 The abuse occurred between 1972 and
1978, and then again in 1983.153 According to the plaintiffs' testi-
mony, they knew the abuse was wrong when it occurred.5 4 How-
ever, they claimed it was not until they reached adulthood - more
specifically, when their older brother (who had also been abused)
committed suicide in 1990 - that they connected their social, psy-
chological, and emotional problems to the abuse they experienced
as children.55 The jury awarded the Gibbons brothers more than
$250,000 each in compensatory and punitive damages.56  The
neighbor appealed, arguing that Minnesota's statute of limitations
barred the brothers' claims.
1
In accordance with the recent Blackowiak decision, the court of
appeals reversed, concluding that because the plaintiffs knew, as
children, that what their neighbor was doing to them was wrong,
they understood, as a matter of law, that they were injured.' 5 Thus,
the statute of limitations had run on their actions.
59
concludes with the almost sarcastic note: "Apparently this court expects even
childhood victims of sexual abuse to possess an understanding of the legal pre-
cepts of Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Hill, 314 N.W.2d 834 (Minn. 1982) which says
that 'as a matter of law one is "injured" if one is sexually abused.'" Id. at 4.






157. Gibbons, 1996 WL 422513, at *1.
158. Id. at *2-3.
159. Id. at *3. Recently, the Minnesota Court of Appeals again affirmed
Blackowiak, holding that the standard remains when the plaintiff knew or should
have known of the abuse, not that the injuries suffered were caused by the abuse.
See Doe v. Redeemer Lutheran Church, 555 N.W.2d 325, 328 (Minn. Ct. App.
1996). In Doe, the plaintiff had been sexually abused between 1967 and 1969 and
it was not until 1990 that he realized he had been abused. See id. at 326. He filed
the claim in 1991 and, thus, the claim was not time-barred under the delayed dis-
covery rule. See id. at 328. In Milbank Ins. Co. v. JT., the Minnesota Court of Ap-
peals again was confronted with the decision of when the statute of limitations
commenced in a sexual abuse case. No. C7-96-1225, 1997 WL 10525, at *1 (Minn.
Ct. App. Jan. 14, 1997). The Milbank court reverted to the statutory version of the
rule, holding that the plaintiffs cause of action did not accrue when he was
abused, as the insurer maintained, but rather when he knew or should have
known that his injuries were caused by the abuse. Id. at *2. Finally, in Scheffler v.
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E. The Minnesota Supreme Court's Underlying Motivations and
Willingness to Disregard the Legislature's Intentions
The supreme court did not specify why it elected to construe
the delayed discovery statute narrowly. A cursory survey of the
opinion, however, reveals that the court feared that a more liberal
interpretation of the law would open the floodgates to litigation
and, consequently, subject defendants to fraudulent or stale claims.
Deeper inspection of these motivating factors undermines the
court's fears. Notwithstanding these concerns, the legislative his-
tory of Minnesota's delayed discovery statute clearly contradicts the
court's interpretation. Last, a comparison of Minnesota's experi-
ence with that of other states demonstrates that the court's inter-
pretation is not only erroneous, but is ripe for legislative reversal.
Each shall be considered in turn.
1. The Court Improperly Takes on the Role of Policymaker
The Blackowiak court's reasoning appears to stem from its fear
of encouraging litigation and its desire to prevent false or stale
claims. While these are important concerns, the court unnecessar-
ily focused upon them here.
First, the Blackowiak holding seems to reflect what may be one
of the supreme court's underlying concerns - that to interpret
Minnesota Statutes section 541.073 more broadly would open the
floodgates to child sexual abuse cases. Indeed, since the enact-
ment of the delayed discovery rule, the number of appellate court
cases of sexual abuse has increased by 9 00%.'60 Still, the numbers
Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the
Blackowiak interpretation while reversing the lower court's denial of summary
judgment for the Archdiocese. 563 N.W.2d 767, 770 (Minn. Ct. App.), review de-
nied (Minn. July 28, 1997). In granting summary judgment, the court of appeals
held that Scheffler "never forgot the incidents" and that "[a]s a matter of law, a
reasonable person in Scheffler's situation should have known, at least by the time
of sexual maturity, that he had been sexually abused." Id. Therefore, under
Blackowiak Scheffler's action was time-barred. See id.
160. In 1989 there was one reported case involving the delayed discovery
rule. See K-E. v. Hoffman, 452 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992). In 1995 that
number had increased to nine. See Winkler v. Magnuson, 539 N.W.2d 821 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1995); K.B. v. Evangelical Lutheran Church in Am., 538 N.W.2d 152
(Minn. Ct. App. 1995); S.E. v. Shattuck-St. Mary's Sch., 533 N.W.2d 628 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1995); Doe v. Redeemer Lutheran Church, 531 N.W.2d 897 (Minn. Ct.
App.), review granted, (Minn. July 20, 1995); M.L. v. Magnuson, 531 N.W.2d 849
(Minn. Ct. App. 1995); V.H. v. Estate of Burnbaum, 529 N.W.2d 462 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1995), affd, 543 N.W.2d 649 (Minn. 1996); Green v. Sawdey, 529 N.W.2d
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remain quite small: 1995 brought only nine cases concerning the
delayed discovery rule.16 ' Thus the court's concern is clearly un-
founded.
A second motivation behind the court's erroneous decision is
its fear of fraudulent claims. As previously indicated, in 1994 less
than one-third of the alleged cases of child sexual abuse were actu-
ally proven.'62 Moreover, recent news stories of a St. Paul psychia-
trist who allegedly planted false memories of sexual abuse in her
patients add impetus to this concern.6  However, it is unlikely that
there will be a flood of sexual abuse litigation, if for no other rea-
sons than the remaining stigma associated with sexual abuse and
survivors' continued reluctance to open old wounds. As the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals stated, "[a] rguments premised on opened
floodgates and broken dams are not persuasive where, as here, we
suspect that only a few drops of water may spill onto a barren des-
ert.,, 64
However, even if a torrent of claims were imminent, one must
question whether increased litigation is a valid reason for such a
narrow interpretation. As Dean William L. Prosser scolds: "It is the
business of the law to remedy wrongs that deserve it, even at the
expense of a 'flood of litigation,' and it is a pitiful confession of in-
competence on the part of any court of justice to deny relief on
such grounds."' 65
520 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); Blackowiak v. Kemp, 528 N.W.2d 247 (Minn. Ct. App.
1995), rev'd, 546 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1996); Oelschlager v. Magnuson, 528 N.W.2d
895 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); Park v. Gravett, 521 N.W.2d 376 (Minn. Ct. App.
1994); Roe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, 518 N.W.2d 629 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1994); ABC v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, 513 N.W.2d 482
(Minn. Ct. App. 1994); H.D. v. White, 483 N.W.2d 501 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
161. See supra note 160.
162. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
163. See Conrad deFiebre, In Testimony, Psychiatrist Defends Work/Ex-patient
says Memoy of Sex Abuse was Planted, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), June 23, 1995, at
lB.
164. Reisner v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 518, 523 (Ct.
App. 1995) (dismissing arguments that justice should be determined by threats of
increased litigation); accord Laird v. Blacker, 279 Cal. Rptr. 700, 711 (Ct. App.)
(stating that "[v]isions of judicial gridlock cannot color our perception of legisla-
tive intent and the temptation to reach a different result is nil where, as here, we
see only the usual floodgates argument, devoid of substance"), review granted and
opinion superseded by 813 P.2d 652 (Cal. 1991), affd, 828 P.2d 691 (Cal. 1992).
165. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 12,
at 56 (5th ed. 1984). Although Professor Prosser's statement is directed at an in-
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The Blackowiak holding may also reflect a public policy con-
cern to protect defendants from stale claims. The purpose of stat-
utes of limitation, in general, is to "eliminate stale claims, grant re-
pose to liability that otherwise would linger on indefinitely, and
permit the judicial system to husband its limited resources."
166
However, a broader interpretation of Minnesota Statutes section
541.073 would not leave the accused open to attack. First, plaintiffs
who, for whatever reason, bring their claims many years after the
abuse occurred will have a difficult time assembling sufficient evi-
dence to carry their burden of proof. 67 Second, defendants are af-
forded adequate protection through the hearsay and exclusionary
rules of evidence.' 68 This is in addition to the delayed discovery
rule itself, which does not toll the statute of limitations from the
time the plaintiff has gathered evidence against the defendant, but
from the time the plaintiff makes the causal connection between
the abuse and the injury. 69 While the Minnesota Supreme Court
may have had the best of intentions in narrowly interpreting the
delayed discovery rule, the facts, figures, and realities associated
with sexual abuse and its victims do not indicate the court's fears
are well-founded.
2. The Legislature's Intentions
Regardless of the supreme court's motivations, the Blackowiak
holding impermissibly modified the delayed discovery rule by
usurping the legislature's authority. In doing so, the supreme
court essentially vanquished boundaries set through the separation
166. Johnson v. Soo Line R.R., 463 N.W.2d 894, 896 (Minn. 1990).
167. See Ann Marie Hagen, Note, Tolling the Statute of Limitations for Adult
Survivors of Childhood Sexual Abuse, 76 IowA L. REv. 355, 375 (1991).
168. Rule 802 of the Minnesota Rules of Evidence provides that hearsay evi-
dence is generally not admissible. MINN. R. EVID. 802. Rule 403 of the Minnesota
Rules of Evidence allows for the exclusion of relevant evidence "if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." MINN. R. EVID. 403.
These rules promote the general interest in ensuring that unreliable evidence
does not reach the jury.
169. See Note, supra note 167, at 375-76; see also Hammer v. Hammer, 418
N.W.2d 23, 27 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (stating that "[s]ince the discovery rule will
not benefit claimants who negligently or purposefully fail to file a timely claim,
the statute of limitations will not be 'effectively eliminated'" (citation omitted));
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 899 cmt. e (1977) (discussing the tolling of
statutes of limitation in all tort actions, not just sexual abuse cases, where knowl-
edge of the injury is not apparent within the statutory period).
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of powers, 170 which are fundamental to our governmental struc-
ture.
1 7 1
It is the province of the legislature to determine the need for a
certain statute. 17 In fact, whether a law is proper in terms of public
policy and need is a matter of legislative determination. It is the
province of the judiciary to interpret the law the legislature pro-
vides.73 Judicial interpretation deals with application of the law -
i.e., how it applies to individual persons or parties before the tri-
bunal. Whether a court has power to enact a rule or law depends
on whether the rule or law involves a procedural or substantive
matter. 174 The judiciary possesses the power to set rules and law re-
garding procedural matters, 175 but creating any substantive law176 is
170. "Separation of powers" refers to the division of the ability to make,
execute, and administer laws. Power is divided between the legislative, judicial,
and executive branches of government. The doctrine of separation of powers
strives to maintain a balanced government. When one branch is precluded from
gaining unreasonable power, tyranny and excessive control is prevented. See
Maynard E. Pirsig & Randall M. Tietjen, Court Procedure and the Separation of Powers
in Minnesota, 15 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 141,142 n.2 (1989).
171. Thomas Jefferson was an early proponent of the doctrine of separation
of powers:
The judiciary... members were left dependent on the legislative, for
their subsistence in office, and some of them for their continuance in it.
If, therefore, the legislature assumes... judiciary powers, no opposition
is likely to be made; nor, if made, can it be effectual; because in that case
they may put their proceedings into the form of an act of assembly,
which will render them obligatory on the other branches. They have,
accordingly, in many instances, decided rights which should have been
left to judiciary controversy .... And this is done with no ill intention.
The views of the present members are perfectly upright. When they are
led out of their regular province, it is by art in others, and inadvertence
in themselves. And this will probably be the case for some time to come.
THOMAS JEFFERSON, Notes on Virginia, Query XIII, in 2 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 163-64 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1907) (1787).
172. The United States and Minnesota Constitutions provide that the legis-
lature is the lawmaking body, comprised of representatives of the people. See U.S.
CONST. art. I; MINN. CONST. art. III; see also Hermeling v. Minnesota Fire & Cas.
Co., 548 N.W.2d 270, 276 (Minn. 1996).
173. See MINN. CONST. art. III (stating that generally no person or persons
belonging to or constituting one government department shall exercise the pow-
ers belonging to either of the other two departments).
174. See State v.Johnson, 514 N.W.2d 551, 554 (Minn. 1994).
175. "A statute is procedural when it neither creates a new cause of action
nor deprives defendant of any defense on the merits." Id. at 555 (quoting Strauch
v. Superior Court, 165 Cal. Rptr. 552, 554 (Ct. App. 1980)).
176. The Minnesota Supreme Court has defined substantive law as "that
part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, as opposed
to. . . 'remedial law,' which prescribes [the] method of enforcing the rights or
obtaining redress for their invasion." Stem v. Dill, 442 N.W.2d 322, 324 (Minn.
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solely a charge of the legislature.' 17
In this case, the legislature enacted a statute of limitation spe-
cific to an action for damages based on personal injury caused by
sexual abuse. 78 A statute of limitation, as a well-settled rule, is a
substantive matter.79 Thus, the judicial duty is to apply the statute
according to its terms. A court may ascertain the legislative intent
only when a statute is ambiguous or unclear.18
0
Judicial dispute raises an inference that a law lacks clarity; in
those circumstances, "[t] he fundamental aim of an appellate court
construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative
intent." 8 ' Thus, where interpretation of the law is not warranted,
the court has no flexibility with construction. More importantly, it
certainly has no power to extend or modify the statutory terms or,
in this case, the statutory limitation period.
Although Minnesota Statutes section 541.073 contains no ref-
erence to the survivor's knowledge of the wrongfulness of the de-
fendant's conduct, the Blackowiak court saw fit to imply one.' 82 The
statute, instead, specifically focuses only on the survivors' knowl-
edge that the abuse caused injury. 1 3 The Blackowiak court, in effect,
ignored the statute.'84
Moreover, because the purpose of the original bill was to
amend the statute of limitations for sexual abuse cases so that it
would begin to run (1) when the abuse was committed, or (2) at
1978).
177. See Johnson, 514 N.W.2d at 554.
178. See MwN. STAT. § 541.073, subd. 2(a) (1996) ("An action for damages
based on personal injury caused by sexual abuse must be commenced within six
years of the time the plaintiff knew or had reason to know that the injury was
caused by the sexual abuse.").
179. See Johnson v. Winthrop Lab. Div. of Sterling Drug, Inc., 291 Minn.
145, 151, 190 N.W.2d 77, 81 (1971) (holding that the alteration of a statute of
limitations is within the province of the legislature).
180. See MINN. STAT. § 645.16(7) (1994). To ascertain legislative intent, a
court may refer to the legislative history surrounding the statute's enactment. See
Phelps v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 537 N.W.2d 271, 274 (Minn. 1995).
However, construction is neither necessary nor permitted where the plain, unam-
biguous language of the statute manifests legislative intention. See id.
181. In re Copeland, 455 N.W.2d 503, 506 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (citing
County of Hennepin v. City of Hopkins, 239 Minn. 357, 362, 58 N.W.2d 851, 854
(1953)); accord Tuma v. Commissioner of Econ. Sec., 386 N.W.2d 702, 707 (Minn.
1986) ("Our objective when construing a statute is to ascertain and effectuate the
legislature's intent.").
182. See Blackowiak v. Kemp, 546 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn. 1996).
183. See MtNN. STAT. § 541.073, subd. 2(a) (1996).
184. See Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 3-4 (Gardebring,J., dissenting).
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the time the victim knew or had reason to know he or she was in-
jured by the sexual abuse, the supreme court's holding does not
give effect to the legislative intent. 18 5 It reads the conjunctive "or"
as an "and," thereby equating the time of the commission of the act
with the time the survivor acknowledges an injury.
8 6
The Minnesota Court of Appeals already rejected a subjective
test in favor of an objective, reasonable person standard.187 The
Blackowiak court's interpretation of the statute provides a stricter
rule. 88 It equates knowledge of abuse with knowledge of injury,
thus creating the ultimate objective standard. Hence, the Blacko-
wiak court effectively eradicated the delayed discovery rule and
turned it into a misnomer 9
Under the present construction, a case where a plaintiff would
be allowed a "delayed discovery" is quite improbable. This rare
case would require a plaintiff to have no awareness that he or she
was being abused at the time of abuse. Such a plaintiff would need
be comatose or abused so commonly as a child that the victim
would be unaware that what he or she was experiencing constituted
abuse. Such a limitation of the standing to bring a sexual abuse
case is absurd; it does not give effect to the statute's legislative in-
tent.
IV. CONCLUSION
Regardless of where one finds oneself in the repressed-
memory debate, the ultimate question is whether Blackowiak v.
Kemp has promoted justice or simply given future courts an avenue
185. See Tape of Legislative Proceedings, Criminal Justice Div. of the House
Judiciary Comm. of the Minn. House of Representatives, H.F. No. 461 (Feb. 28,
1989) (tape on file at the Minnesota Legislative Library). In the February 28,
1989, meeting of the Criminal Justice Division of the House Judiciary Committee,
attorney Jeff Anderson testified on behalf of the bill. Anderson stated that the bill
"recognized the reality of sexual abuse." Id. Such victims suffer a "unique kind of
psychological damage that prevents them from recognizing they are being injured
by [the sexual abuse]." Id. Fern Sepler, the executive director of the Criminal
Witness Advisory Council and the co-chair of the Attorney General's Task Force
also testified in support of the bill. Id. Ms. Sepler noted that suppression of the
trauma of sexual assault is both a natural and an expected response to the assault
for both children and adults. She asserted that this reality must be reflected in
the delayed discovery rule. Id.
186. See Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 4 (Gardebring,J., dissenting).
187. See supra note 128 (citing cases).
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to an easy conclusion. A minority of jurisdictions allow the statute
of limitations for sexual abuse cases to be tolled either until the
abused party acknowledges the abuse or until the abused party rec-
ognizes the causal connection between the early abuse and the
later injury. Minnesota had been among that minority prior to the
Blackowiak decision. Knowledge of the abuse and its immediate
physical harm can still leave a child blamelessly ignorant of the fact
that the abuse may cause later psychological injuries. Moreover, it
is not only cases of incest that involve secrecy, threats of harm,
blaming, and an abuse of authority.1 90
The Blackowiak holding ignores the Minnesota Legislature's in-
tent, ignores the plain meaning of Minnesota Statutes section
541.073, and ignores Minnesota case law that puts the emphasis on
knowledge of the link between the act and the injury, rather than
merely focusing on the time of the abusive act. There was legal
support for an affirmance on Blackowiak. However, the supreme
court simply chose to look elsewhere, lured by an easy checklist to
a quick disposition:
Yes No
EJ 0 Did you always remember the abuse?
0 0 Did you feel guilt or shame at the time of the abuse?
Check "yes," and your claim is barred.
190. See Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780, 788 (Wis.
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